“中国” is not China: rectify “China” and make it “支那” again

In July, 2016, when the states in the South China Sea region, notably Vietnam and Philippines resisted People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s claim of the region, a twitter user supporting China’s claim stated :“Philippines said South China Sea was not Chinese? Ridiculous. They’ve said ‘South CHINA Sea’#SouthChinaSea#南海是中国的”. Two other twitter users, under the same hashtag #南海是中国的, showed similar logic: “Don’t be so ridiculous. It’s called “SouthChinaSea” it always belongs to China!” “You can search the Internet, all the history shows that the South China Sea is China’s. Or why the name of the South China Sea?” Besides the comments’ blatant nationalistic and even chauvinistic tone, they sent a very dangerous signal: the Chinese public are not able or willing to distinguish sovereignty from geography. The term “China” is first and foremost a geographical term, especially in the phrase “South China Sea”. However, the reasoning behind these comments paves the way for PRC’s claim over any geographical areas that contain the word “China”.

It is reasonable to speculate that these twitter accounts are simply trolls run by the Chinese government. Unfortunately, that seems unlikely. The PRC’s official wording back in 2016 was actually much more flexible and sophisticated than that, domestically and internationally. In Chinese, the PRC and its controlled media, for example here, Zhihu, was able to distinguish between “South China Sea”南中国海 and “China’s South Sea”中国南海. It recognizes “South China Sea”南中国海 as an international water body while “China’s South Sea”中国南海 as a part of it. Although PRC’s definition of “China’s South Sea” would still challenge the sovereignty of the surrounding nations, it at least demonstrated a separation of geography and sovereignty. On the international stage, PRC completely ignored the wordplay. Instead, its argument drew most of the evidence from Chinese sources. It would turn out to be insufficient, as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea(UNCLOS) rejected the PRC’s claim.

From the same Zhihu(in a sense China’s Quora) page quoted above, some comments shared the same reasoning and sentiment as those of the twitter accounts. The question is “What is the difference between the South China Sea and China’s South Sea?”中国南海与南中国海有什么区别. “No difference. [they are] all Chinese territory.” “There is only China’s South Sea. There is no South China Sea.” It is thus safe to assume that the Chinese public, not necessarily the docile victims of PRC’s state propaganda, does not and even choose not to distinguish between geography and sovereignty. It is their version of Chinese nationalism. It is their understanding of patriotism. Since 2016, the prudence of Chinese officials and diplomats that the world was so used to during the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao eras quickly vanished. Xi Jinping’s Wolf Warrior Diplomacy irritated the rest of the world, but won the unprecedented public support domestically ever since Mao.

This article’s task is to find the reason behind this rise of PRC’s “neo-nationalism”, and how could the rest of the world respond. I argue that PRC’s neo-nationalism is not nationalism at all. It is imperialism. The rise of “neo-nationalism” is actually the revival of the imperialistic ambition. PRC is an empire, not a nation-state, but the translation of “China” as 中国 concealed its imperialistic ambition under the appearance of “China’s” struggle for sovereignty. This disguise has misguided the world for generations. PRC’s imperialistic ambition has caused numerous humanitarian disasters, genocides, wars, and regional and global crises. Acknowledging it as an empire is the first step to tackle its imperialistic ambition. It is thus imperative to translated “China” as 支那 instead of 中国. From now on, I will use the word “China” in its geographical sense, unless otherwise indicated.

Those familiar with the history of Buddhism or early Chinese history would probably know that “China” in Sanskrit is Cina. A variety of Chinese characters were assigned to Cina, and 支那 was one of them. Those familiar with modern East Asian history would probably know that 支那(Japanese: シナ, shina) seemed like a derogatory term Imperial Japan used on the Qing empire(1644–1912) and the Republic of China (ROC). Those specialised in modern East Asian history would tell us that 支那 only became a derogatory term during and after the Sino-Japanese War(1937–1945). Shina 支那 was once a neutral and descriptive term used by Liang Qichao and Sun Yat-sen referring to the territories controlled by the Qing empire. When nationalism spread from Europe to the rest of the world, the Qing empire also experienced the struggle. China’s transformation from empire to nation-state in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century has been thoroughly researched. Contemporary scholars have convincingly argued that the “China” we know today was largely a modern construct with less than 150 years of history. The concepts such as “nation-state”, “legitimacy”, “international law”, “sovereignty” and the like were introduced in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, and translation played a deciding role. As Duara indicates in Resecuring History from the Nation, the past is composed of conflicting and competing possibilities. This is especially true with the translation of “China”. 中国 was only one of the possible translations. In turn, 中国 only represents one of the futures for China.

The current connotation of “中国” is self contradictory, since “中” or “中华” indicates the imperialistic ambition while “国” nation-state. “中”, or middle/central, as many scholars have noticed, is a reflection of a long-lasting belief that the Yellow river valley, the birthplace of the Shang civilization, was the center of the world. A great achievement of the “central civilization” is either conquesting or “civilizing” surrounding “barbarians”. It became a major source of legitimacy for each and every “sinicized” empire since the Qin empire(221 B.C.E.-206 B.C.E.). Generally speaking, the process of Inner Asian empires abandoning its steppe roots and accepting this centralizing mission is called sinicization. Empires established by Inner Asian ethnic groups, from the Tang empire(618–907) to the Qing empire, only became “central empires” after the ruling elites accepted such a mission. For instance, James Hevia notices the importance of presenting Qing China as the empire in the center, not to Europeans, but to its own subjects. On the other hand, the Mongol empire abandoned this mission and retreated to the north, leaving the Mongol-influenced Ming empire to continue this mission. Sinicization usually requires the adoption of Civil Examination and the revocation of the privileges of warrior-elites from the tribal era, as witnessed in the decline of the Bannerman旗人 status throughout the Qing history. The mobilized resources then feuled the central empire’s political and military machines to conquer or “civilize” the surrounding “barbarians”. The “central empire” thus expanded from the yellow river valley to the south of the Yangtze river and beyond. The conquest of other regions often ended with massacre, forceful assimilation, and cultural genocide. For instance, the Red Basin, or Sichuan Basin, was originally a home to a distinguished civilization represented by Sanxingdui. The conquest of this region by the Qin state in 316 B.C.E. resulted in the loss of ancient Shu蜀 texts. The very Chinese characters 巴(originally means snake) and 蜀(originally means silkworm) assigned to this region revealed the central empire’s animalization of it. This region was still not regarded as “China proper” or 华夏 during the Three Kingdoms Period(220–280), and continuous armed conflicts between Red Basin’s regional resistance forces and imperial armies persisted throughout history.

Meanwhile, as contemporary scholars on imperialism have argued, colonization and imperialism transformed the colonizer as well as the colonized. The ruling elites/colonizers lost their military might and cultural roots after the revocation of warrior privileges and the spoils of imperialistic wars. They became increasingly alike to the peoples they have conquered before: adopted names in Chinese characters, participated in Civil Examinations and engaged in other non-political businesses. The colonized lost their traditional and cultural roots as well. But in many cases they disappeared completely from the historical documents. The accomplished Chinese essayist Liang Yuchun梁遇春(1906–1932) best illustrated the tragedy of central empire and sinicization in his article “cats and dogs”猫狗:

北平却是一只猫。它代表灵魂的堕落。北平这地方有一种霉气，使人们百事废弛，最好什么也不想，也不干了，只是这么蹲着呆呆地过日子。

These people are the “Han Chinese”汉人 in modern context. “Han” is not an ethnicity, but a political identity. Han Chinese are those who lost their traditional and cultural roots and identified with the central empire. The Han Chinese considered themselves the loyal subjects of the central empire, and they are treated as such. What we categorize as “Han Chinese’’ today share no common language, customs, creed or racial origin. Instead, they share a common political status. For instance, “Sichuanese Han” and “Cantonese Han” could not even understand each other without mandarin. But compared to minorities that live among them like Tujia or Miao peoples, no where in PRC do Han Chinese enjoy bonus in College Entrance Examination(or 高考) or the rights to have more than one child, before the recent reforms. The state understands that the discriminatory policies would not cause resentment towards the empire. Instead it inflames their jealousy towards other minorities, precisely because the Han Chinese are loyal subjects. Consequently, from the perspectives of the state, the “minorities”, and the Han Chinese themselves, “Han” could only be comprehended as a political identity, not an ethnicity. This is not just a PRC phenomenon. We can see that in Liang’s text as well. 1920s Beiping 北平 described above was a city that lost its imperial glory. It has been the capital of multiple central empires since the 13th century, but the collapse of the Qing empire in 1912 cost Beiping its imperial glory. The Han Chinese living there thus lost the “soul” too.

“国” on the other hand, reflects a recent reinvention of this Chinese character. With the introduction of nationalism, nation-state, and international law, the translation of the “Qing empire” was in itself a part of the nation building process. “大清国”, or the “Great Qing state” was the term for Qing empire’s subjects. It aimed at the transformation of the Qing empire to a Qing nation-state, because “国” now grants “大清” the responsibility and power to transform the Qing subjects to nation-state citizens. This turned out to be a suicide and an immediate reincarnation. The Qing empire was at its last stage of sinicization, but the collapse of it liberated proto nations like Manchuria, Mongolia, East Turkestan and Tibet. It also provided an opportunity for ethnic groups with distinct language, religion, and identity, like Sichuanese, Hunanese, Cantonese and others to grow. For instance, it is now known to many that young Mao Zedong once advocated for a “湖南国” in 1919. Likewise, the Sichuanese novelist Li Jieren believed a “四川国” would be strong and independent. In other words, former ethnic groups, let alone internationally recognized nations like Mongols and Tibetans, within the former Qing territory have utilized the opportunity to construct their own versions of nation-states after the empire’s collapse. This was in itself a challenge against the revival of the central empire as well. A multinational East Asian continent was once a historical possibility.

It is now common knowledge that the Soviet Union and the Comintern played a deciding role in the elimination of that possibility. The Soviets indirectly established and directly armed two Leninist revolutionary parties: Kuomintang(KMT) and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in order to destroy the treaty port system in East Asia and counter the advancement of Imperial Japan. KMT and CCP introduced the party-state system to East Asia and defeated communities with local/native legitimacy, or often villified as “warlords”. From a subaltern perspective, it is necessary to point out that a comparatively small fraction of elites and intellectuals were willing to accept KMT and/or CCP because they wanted to use Leninism and party-state system to revive the central empire. The marriage between the imperial ambition which was lost since the fall of the Qing empire and the Leninist party-state system was consummated, and the “中国” as we understood today was finally born. “中”(and sometimes “中华”), as shown earlier, symbolizes empire, while “国” grants the fallen empire all the modern tools to revive it: party-state system, total war, planned economy, Stalinism, modern bureaucracy, mobilization, genocide, etc. As a result, the revival of the central empire with modern mechanisms claimed over a hundred millions lives. It is even more depressing news that the legacy is now in the hands of Xi Jinping. Like its predecessors, the latest central empire, the People’s Republic of China, still fails to escape the sinicization process. Xi symbolizes the sinicization of the PRC and the CCP. Since coming to power, he has revoked the privileges of many red princelings and post Mao technocrats. He speaks perfect Mandarin, appeals to the rise of popular “neo-nationalism”, takes away the already limited freedom of speech and invades whatever was left of the rights and autonomy of minorities and disenfranchised groups. In short, Xi became more and more like the Han Chinese described above and a traditional emperor in Chinese historical texts, and less and less a true Marxist or Leninist. The CCP was once the result of the international communist movement, now after Xi’s reforms, it has become a machine working for the central empire’s revival. As the new emperor, Xi and his new central empire are preparing for the mission of conquering or “civilizing” surrounding nations again.

It should be clear now why the term “中国” was in itself dangerous. Stefan Tanaka in her Japan’s Orident: Rendering Pasts into History, convincingly argues that Japan’s translation of China as シナ was its first step towards pan-Asianism and Showa Japan’s imperialism. Similarly, the translation of China as “中国” opens the path for PRC’s imperialism. This issue is especially important in East Asia. In English and other languages outside of East Asia, users of “China” are generally able to detect three layers of meanings within the term: geographical, historical/cultural, and political. But if we translate China as “中国”, it causes confusions for nations that uses Chinese characters, because the characters “中” and “国” has no geographical meaning. It is thus very easy for ambitious leaders like Xi and the Han Chinese who longed for the revival of the empire to take this advantage. They intentionally use China vis-a-vis “中国” ambiguously in order to argue that any geographical space that has the word “China” in it is historically and culturally Chinese, and thus a rightful PRC’s claim. In the end, we witness in the beginning the inability or unwillingness of the public to distinguish geography from sovereignty. Many of them unconsciously became the subjects or tools of the empire. More significantly, this confusion puts many East Asian nations in danger. For instance, Taiwan was never under the administration of the PRC. If anything, it was once under the administration of its enemy, the KMT. But because both PRC and KMT represent “中国”, it gave PRC the claim of the island. Not many nations in East Asia have no history of communication with “中国”. If “中国” is going to claim each and every single one of them, East Asia would never be in peace. While Imperial Japan’s translation of China as 支那 did imply a sense of imperialism back then, Japan has certainly abandoned that ambition today. Translating China as “支那” would no longer stimulate Japan’s nonexistent imperialism. Meanwhile, the phonetic translation serves the purpose of separating “中国” from China. “中国” is not China, but a recurring imperialistic ambition. It is not the only historical possibility, but the worst of all possibilities. “支那” was a neutral term in late Qing, precisely because “中国” was not the only possible future for China back then.

In addition, translating China as “支那” also helps awaken the people under the rule of the PRC. Many of them, even the irritating “little pink”小粉红, choose to comply with PRC’s imperialism simply because they did not know better. They did not know that their grandparents and great-grandparents once had the opportunity of a multi-state, European-like future. Recent emergence of independent movements in China is a promising sign showing Chinese people’s discontent over “中国” and PRC’s imperialism. If led in the right direction, this force could be much stronger than “中国民主势力”, because a multinational East Asia has existed less than a hundred years ago, but a democratic 中国 has never existed.